Atlanta, Ga., Siege of, July 20 to Sept. 2, 1864.  Army  of the Cumberland, Army of the Tennessee, and Army of the  Ohio.  The objectives points for the year 1864 were Richmond  and Atlanta-the head and heart of the Confederacy.  Early in  March Gen. U. S. Grant was made lieutenant-general and  transferred to the immediate command of the Army of the  Potomac, Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman being at the same time placed  in command of the forces in the West.  Sherman's new command  consisted of four departments: the Army of the Cumberland, at  Chattanooga, commanded by Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas ; the  Army of the Tennessee, at Huntsville, Ala., commanded by Maj.- Gen. James B. McPherson; the Army of the Ohio, in East  Tennessee, commanded by Maj.-Gen. John M. Schofield, and the  Army of Arkansas, under the command of Maj.-Gen. Frederick  Steele.  The last named was subsequently transferred to  Canby's trans-Mississippi division, and took no part in the  Atlanta campaign.  The Army of the Cumberland was composed of  the 4th, 14th and 20th army corps, respectively commanded by  Maj.-Gens. O. O. Howard John M. Palmer and Joseph Hooker; the  cavalry corps of Brig.-Gen. Washington L. Elliott, and some  unattached troops.  The 4th corps was made up of three  divisions, commanded by Maj.-Gen. David S Stanley, Brig.-Gen.  John Newton and Brig-Gen Thomas J. Wood and later in the  campaign an artillery brigade was organized and placed under  the command of Maj. Thomas W. Osborn.  In the 14th corps were  three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig. Gen. R. W.  Johnson, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis, and the 3rd  by Brig.-Gen. Absalom Baird.  In this corps was also an  artillery brigade, commanded by Maj. Charles Houghtaling.  The  20th corps comprised three divisions, the 1st commanded by  Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. John W.  Geary, and the 3rd by Maj.-Gen. Daniel Butterfield.  Maj. John  Reynolds commanded the artillery brigade of the 20th corps  after it was organized in July.  The cavalry corps included  the three divisions commanded by Brig.Gens. Edward McCook,  Kenner Garrard and Judson Kilpatrick.  The Army of the  Tennessee embraced the 15th, 16th and 17th army corps,  commanded by Maj.-Gens.  John A. Logan, Grenville M. Dodge and  Frank P. Blair. Logan's corps included the divisions of Brig.- Gens.  Peter J. Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith and William Harrow.  In Dodge's corps were the divisions of Brig.-Gens. Thomas W.  Sweeny and James C. Veatch.  The 17th corps was made up of the  two divisions commanded by Brig.-Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett and  Brig.-Gen. Walter Q. Gresham.  The Army of the Ohio consisted  of the 23rd corps, which was composed of the three divisions  of infantry commanded by Brig.-Gens. Alvin P. Hovey, Henry M.  Judah and Jacob D. Cox and the cavalry division of Maj.-Gen.  George Stoneman.  The effective strength of the army on May 1,  1864, was 98,797 men, with 254 pieces of artillery.  At that  time the 17th corps was not with the main body.  After it  joined on June 8 the effective strength was 112,819 men.      Opposed to this force was the Confederate army under the  command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.  It was made up of  Hardee's corps, consisting of Cheatham's, Cleburne's and  Walker's divisions and the artillery under Col. Melancthon  Smith; Hood's (or Lee's) corps, consisting of the divisions of  Hindman, Stevenson and Stewart and the artillery under Col. R.  F. Beckham; Wheeler's cavalry corps, embracing Martin's,  Kelly's and Hume's divisions and Roddey, command, with the  artillery under Col. F. H. Robertson; Polk's corps, which  included Loring's, French's and Cantey's (or Walthall's)  divisions, the cavalry division of Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson,  and the 1st division of the Georgia state militia.  In his  article in "Battles and Leaders," Johnston states his  effective forces as being 42,856 men, with 112 guns, but Maj.  E. C. Dawes, of the 53rd Ohio, who made an extended  investigation into the subject, estimates the Confederate  strength at Resaca as being at least 67,000 men with 168  cannon, and figures that Johnston had under his command  something over 84,000 men later in the campaign.      With a view of preventing Johnston from sending  reinforcements to Longstreet in East Tennessee, and also to  assist Sherman's expedition to Meridian, Miss., Thomas made a  demonstration against Dalton, Ga., in the latter part of  February, but the campaign against Atlanta really began with  the occupation of Tunnel Hill by the Union forces on the 7th  of May.  Then followed engagements at Rocky Face Ridge, Mill  Creek Gap, Dug Gap, Dalton, Resaca, Lay's Ferry, Adairsville,  Cassville, New Hope Church, Pickett's Mills, Big Shanty, Brush  Mountain, Kolb's Farm, Kennesaw Mountain, Ruff's Station,  Smyrna and the Chattahoochee river, with almost constant  skirmishing as Johnston retired toward Atlanta.  On July 17th  Sherman's entire army crossed the Chattahoochee, his advance  being within 8 miles of the city.  Up to this time Johnston  had acted on the defensive and so well had he conducted his  campaign that it had taken Sherman nearly two and a half  months to advance a distance of 100 miles.  During the winter  of 1863-64 Gen. Gilmer, Confederate chief engineer, had  strengthened Atlanta as a base for Johnston's army by  intrenching the city.  About the middle of June Capt. Grant of  the engineers was instructed to strengthen these  fortifications, especially on the northern side, toward  Peachtree creek. Johnston had been promised by Gen. Maury at  Mobile a number of rifled guns for this portion of the works,  and Gov. Brown had promised 10,000 state troops to aid in the  defense of the city.  Johnston's plan was to engage the Union  army while it was, divided in crossing Peachtree creek.  If he  failed there he would fall back to the line of works  constructed by Grant, where he could hold on until the arrival  of the state troops, when he could sally out and attack either  flank of the Federal forces as opportunity offered.  But he  was not permitted to carry out his plans.  His defensive  campaign had not found favor with the Confederate authorities,  and on the very day the Union forces crossed the Chattahoochee  he received the following telegram from Adjt.-Gen. Cooper at  Richmond: "I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you  that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to  the vicinity of Atlanta, and express no confidence that you  can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the  command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you  will immediately turn over to General Hood."      The news of the change soon reached the Federal lines,  where it was received with general satisfaction.  Knowing the  feeling of the Confederate government toward Johnston's  course, the new commander determined upon an aggressive  policy.  His opportunity soon came.  Schofield had crossed the  Chattahoochee at Phillips, ferry, near the mouth of Soap  creek, and moved against the Georgia railroad in the vicinity  of Decatur.  McPherson had effected a crossing at Roswell and  moved to Schofield's left, striking the railroad between  Decatur and Stone Mountain where Garrard's cavalry and M. L.  Smith's division destroyed several miles of track.  He then  effected a junction with Schofield and moved toward the city.  On the 19th Sherman ordered Thomas to hold his right near  Howell's mill on Peachtree creek and swing his left across the  stream to connect with Schofield.  Davis, division made an  attempt to cross at the mill, but finding the enemy too strong  on the opposite bank moved farther down the stream, where he  crossed without serious resistance, though Dilworth's brigade  had a sharp skirmish with and repulsed a Confederate  detachment.  Geary succeeded in crossing about half a mile  above the mill.  Wood moved forward on the Buckhead road, but  found the bridge destroyed and a force strongly intrenched on  the high bank opposite.  By resorting to a flank movement he  succeeded, after a stubborn fight, in gaining a footing on the  south side of the creek below the road.  At dark that evening  Thomas had the heads of three columns on the south side of the  Peachtree and the remainder of his army in position to follow  early on the 20th.  There was still a considerable gap between  Thomas and Schofield, and to remedy this Sherman ordered  Howard to extend his line to the left to connect with  Schofield. Stanley's division crossed the north fork of the  Peachtree above the Buckhead road and went into camp for the  night between the forks of the creek, ready to move toward  Schofield's line early on the following morning.  Baird's  division of Palmer's corps crossed during the night and took  position on the left of Davis, who occupied the extreme right  of the line, and early the next morning Johnson crossed and  moved into position on the left of Baird.  Hooker sent over  Williams, division to form on Geary's right, and Ward's  (formerly Butterfield's) was ordered to Geary's left.  Wood's  division made a detour to join Stanley and Newton moved up on  the Buckhead road into the position vacated by Wood.  The  general course of Peachtree creek is westwardly.  Howell's  mill stood at the point where the Marietta road crossed the  creek and from there to Buckhead bridge the distance was about  a mile and a half up the stream.  About half-way between the  two roads a small stream called Shoal creek flowed into the  Peachtree from the south, and a short distance east of the  Buckhead road was another stream known as Clear creek.  On the  bank of Shoal creek, about a quarter of a mile from the mouth,  stood Collier's mill.  Newton after relieving Wood, moved  forward to a position about half a mile south of the  Peachtree, his left thrown out toward Clear creek, with his  line commanding the cross road running to Collier's mill, and  threw up a barricade of rails and logs.  In a hollow to his  right and rear lay Ward's division, while still farther to the  right beyond Shoal creek was Geary.      Hood was aware of the gap in the Federal line and planned  an assault on Thomas before Schofield and McPherson could come  to his support.  The attack was ordered for 1 p. m. on the  20th, with Stewart's corps on the left, Hardee's in the center  and Cheatham's on the right.  Wheeler's cavalry was sent to  hold Schofield and McPherson in check, Cheatham was instructed  to hold his left on the creek in order to keep between Thomas  and Schofield, and the other two corps were to be hurled  against Thomas.  The advance was to be made by divisions in  echelon, beginning on Hardee's right, and when the Union lines  were forced back to the creek the Confederates were to turn to  the left and press down the creek toward the west, sweeping  everything before them.  At the last minute it became  necessary to change the plan of battle to meet certain  contingencies.  Schofield and McPherson had moved faster than  flood had expected, notwithstanding Wheeler's efforts to hold  them back.  On the night of the 19th Schofield crossed the  south fork of the Peachtree and took up a position along  Peavine creek, almost parallel to Cheatham's line of  intrenchments.  To prevent Schofield from forming a junction  with Thomas, Cheatham was directed to withdraw a division from  his left to meet Schofield, and Hardee and Stewart were  ordered to move to the right to close the space thus vacated.  This movement caused a delay, so that it was about 4 o'clock  before the attack was begun.  The movement of the Confederates  to the right brought Hardee in front of Newton who bore the  brunt of the first assault.  Without skirmishers Hardee  advanced with Bate on the right, Walker in the center, Maney  on the left and Cleburne in reserve.  His first division  passed Newton's left flank near Clear creek and for a little  while it looked as though Newton would be swept from his  position.  But Bradley's brigade, which was in reserve,  quickly formed and with the assistance of a well manned  battery repulsed the attack.  Kimball's brigade, on the right  of the road, was forced to change front to meet a force that  was outflanking it.  The movement was successfully executed  and just at this juncture the brigades of Wood, Harrison and  Coburn, of Ward's division, came up on Kimball's right.  The  sudden appearance of these fresh troops threw the enemy into  confusion and he beat a precipitate retreat.  In the meantime  the attack had been extended beyond Shoal creek toward the  Union right.  Near Collier's mill was an angle between Ward  and Geary.  When the enemy had advanced into this angle  Geary's batteries opened with canister at short range and at  the same time a fierce infantry fire was maintained both in  front and on the flank.  The slaughter here was terrific.  After the fight Geary's fatigue parties buried over 400 of the  Confederate dead.  Stewart sent in the divisions of Loring and  Walthall, holding French within easy supporting distance.   This part of the Confederate line was subjected to a heavy  enfilading fire and forced to retire with heavy losses.   Loring lost 1,062 men in a few minutes.  Again and again the  Confederates rallied and advanced to the assault.  But Thomas- "The Rock of Chickamauga"-was there in person, directing the  movements of his men, all of whom had the utmost confidence in  their general and presented a front that was invincible.  Ward's batteries were placed in a position to sweep the Clear  creek valley, driving back Bate's column that was trying to  gain Newton's rear. The enemy's losses in the subsequent at  tacks were not so great as in the first charge but their  repulse was none the less decisive.  The efforts to reform the  lines for another assault were continued until sunset, when  the attempt was abandoned and the enemy retired within his  works.  The Federal loss at the battle of Peachtree creek in  killed, wounded and missing was 1,707.  No official report of  the Confederate casualties was made.  General Hooker's  estimate of their losses in front of the 20th corps was 4,400  in killed and wounded, and the total loss in killed, wounded  and missing was not far from 6,000.  While the battle of  Peachtree creek was in progress Gresham's division forced  Wheeler's cavalry back across the Augusta road toward Bald  Hill.  In this movement Gresham was severely wounded and  Brig.-Gen. Giles A. Smith was assigned to the command of the  division.      The 21st was spent by Thomas and Schofield in the  readjustment of their lines.  Skirmish lines were advanced and  intrenched within a short distance of the enemy's works, and  the space between Howard and Logan was filled by Schofield's  troops.  On the Union left McPherson was more aggressive.  Seeing that Bald Hill was the key point to the situation on  that part of the line he determined to possess it.  The hill  was held by Cleburne's division, which had occupied and  intrenched it the night before.  McPherson sent Force's  brigade of Leggett's division, supported by Giles A. Smith,  against Cleburne.  Force advanced under cover of the hill  itself until within a short distance of the enemy's lines and  then made a dashing charge across the intervening open space  against the slight intrenchment before him. Cleburne's men  were veterans and met the charge with that bravery which had  distinguished them on other fields, but after a sharp combat  they were forced to yield.  The hill, afterward known as  Leggett's hill, was promptly manned by artillery, well  supported by infantry, and a few shells were thrown into the  city.      Having failed in his attempt against Thomas, Hood now  turned his attention to McPherson.  In his report he says:  "The position and demonstration of McPherson's army on the  right threatening my communications made it necessary to  abandon Atlanta or check his movements.  Unwilling to abandon,  the following instructions were given on the morning of the  21st: The chief engineer was instructed to select a line of  defense immediately about Atlanta, the works already  constructed for the defense of the place being wholly useless  from their position; Stewart's and Cheatham's corps to take  position and construct works to defend the city, the former on  the left, the latter on the right.  The artillery, under the  command of Brig.-Gen. Shoup, was massed on the extreme right.  Hardee was ordered to move with his corps during the night of  the 21st south on the McDonough road, crossing Intrenchment  creek at Cobb's mills, and to completely turn the left of  McPherson's army.  This he was to do, even should it be  necessary to go to or beyond Decatur.  Wheeler, with his  cavalry, was ordered to move on Hardee's right, both to attack  at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible.  As soon as  Hardee succeeded in forcing back the enemy's left, Cheatham  was to take up the movement from his right and continue to  force the whole from right to left down Peachtree creek,  Stewart in like manner to engage the enemy as soon as the  movement became general."      Such were Hood's plans for his sortie of the 22nd, but  again the unforeseen interposed to prevent its success.  Blair's corps, its right at Bald Hill, had a line of  intrenchments along the McDonough road which made it necessary  for Hardee to take a different route from the one laid down by  Hood, so that he was not in position to begin his attack until  about noon.  At daybreak that morning the Confederate works in  front of Thomas and Schofield were found abandoned.  Of this  situation Sherman says in his report: "I confess I thought the  enemy had resolved to give us Atlanta without further contest,  but General Johnston had been relieved of his command and  General Hood substituted.  A new policy seemed resolved on, of  which the bold attack on our right was the index.  Our  advancing ranks swept across the strong and well finished  parapets of the enemy and closed in upon Atlanta until we  occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about 2  miles radius, when we again found him occupying in force a  line of finished redoubts which had been prepared for more  than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta, and  we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts with  curtains, strengthened by rifle-trench, abatis and chevaux- defrise."      In contracting the lines about the city Dodge's corps  (the 16th) was thrown somewhat to the rear by the 15th corps  connecting with Schofield's right near the Howard house where  Sherman had his headquarters.  Dodge was therefore ordered to  move to McPherson's left flank to strengthen and extend the  line in that direction.  About noon the two divisions of  Dodge's corps were marching by fours in a long column to the  new position.  Their line of march was nearly parallel to  Hardee's line of battle, consisting of Bate's and Walker's  divisions, concealed in the timber on the left.  The first  intimation Dodge had of the presence of an enemy came with a  few straggling shots from the Confederate skirmishers.  All  Dodge had to do was to face his veterans to the left and they  were in good line of battle on ground well calculated for  defense.  Thus the engagement was begun on different ground  and with a different body of troops from what Hood intended or  Hardee expected.  When the corps halted and faced to the left  Fuller's (formerly Veatch's) division was on the right and  Sweeny's on the left.  In front was an open field over which  the enemy must advance.  Fuller received the brunt of the  first attack, but it was handsomely repulsed.  Walker's and  the 14th Ohio batteries were wheeled into position and these,  with the unerring infantry fire, checked every attempt to  cross the field, each time driving back the enemy with heavy  losses.  Some idea of the carnage at this part of the field  may be gained from the statement that 13 of Walker's men were  found dead in one corner of a rail fence behind which the line  was formed.  In one of these charges Gen. Walker rode out of  the woods, swinging his hat to cheer forward his men, and a  moment later was shot from his horse, dying almost instantly.  While the line was in some confusion Fuller made a headlong  charge and captured a number of prisoners, including the  colonel and adjutant of the 66th Ga. McPherson was in  consultation with Blair and Logan near the railroad when the  sound of the firing was heard, and hurried to the scene of  action.  Noticing that a considerable gap existed between  Dodge's right and Blair's left, he sent orders to Logan to  push forward a brigade to close up the line.  A short time  served to satisfy McPherson that Dodge could hold his position  and he started back to Blair.  Just at this juncture  Cleburne's skirmishers were advancing into the gap above  mentioned.  They called to McPherson to surrender, but instead  of obeying the summons he lifted his hat, as if in salute, and  wheeled his horse to gallop away.  His action drew forth a  volley and he fell mortally wounded.  As soon as the news  reached Sherman he assigned Logan to the temporary command of  the Army of the Tennessee.  The sound of the volley that  killed McPherson told Fuller that the enemy was advancing on  his right and he threw forward the 64th Ill., armed with the  Henry repeating rifles, to protect his flank.  This regiment  met Cleburne's skirmishers with such a galling fire that they  fell back with a loss of several in killed and wounded and  some 40 prisoners.  Upon one of the prisoners was found  McPherson's effects, including an important despatch to  Sherman, and the body of the dead general was soon afterward  recovered.      Almost immediately after the fall of McPherson the  divisions of Cleburne and Maney emerged from the timber on the  right of Dodge and under the protection of a heavy artillery  fire from the ridge in their rear advanced in three columns  against the left and rear of the 17th corps.  They struck  Blair's left flank, fronting west, then swung through the gap  and seized the works constructed by Leggett and Smith in their  advance on Bald Hill the day before.  In this movement the  16th Iowa, 245 men, on Blair's extreme left was cut off and  captured.  On moved the Confederate advance until it reached  the foot of the hill and even began the ascent to attack  Leggett's works on the summit.  Here the tide of battle was  turned.  Smith's division leaped over their works and began to  pour in a deadly fire from the other side.  Wangelin's  brigade, which Logan had sent in response to McPherson's last  order to occupy the gap, arrived and opened fire on the  enemy's flank.  This gave Blair an opportunity to change front  and form a new line, by which arrangement the Confederates  were forced back.  Hood watched the movement from a salient in  the city's fortifications, and about 3 p. m., when he saw  Hardee's attack had driven Blair's left back far enough to  attack the hill from the south, ordered Cheatham's corps and  the state troops under G. W. Smith to move against the Union  position from the Atlanta side.  Here Col. Jones, of the 53rd  Ohio, with two regiments of M. L. Smith's division and two  guns of Battery A, 1st Ill. artillery, occupied a position on  a hill about half a mile in advance of the main line.  Near  his position the railroad ran through a deep cut and close by  stood a large house of which the enemy could take advantage to  cover his advance along the railroad.  Jones wanted to burn  the house but failed to get permission to do so.  Cheatham  sent forward Manigault's brigade to occupy it, while the main  body of the corps poured through the cut and struck Jones on  the flank, throwing his line into disorder.  The two guns were  spiked, however, before they fell into the hands of the enemy.      About 800 yards in advance of the 15th corps was Battery  H (De Gress'), 1st Ill. light artillery, composed of 20- pounder Parrott guns and occupying the works evacuated by the  enemy on the night of the 21st.  The battery, practically  unsupported, was charged about 4 o'clock.  The attack in front  was repulsed, but the enemy gained the rear, and De Gress,  seeing that capture was imminent, spiked the guns and withdrew  his men.  The guns were soon afterward recaptured, unspiked  and fired a few rounds after the retreating enemy.  This part  of the engagement was witnessed by Sherman from his position  near the Howard house and he ordered Schofield to mass his  artillery there and open a cross fire on Cheatham as he  advanced toward the hill.  At the same time the 1st division  of the 15th corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. C. R. Woods, and  Mersey's brigade of Sweeny's division moved forward and  attacked Cheatham on flank and rear, checking his advance.   The whole 15th corps now rallied and by a counter charge drove  Cheatham in confusion from the field recapturing De Gress,  guns.  This virtually ended the battle.  Though several  subsequent attacks were made they only served to increase the  Confederate losses without giving them any advantage.  Hardee  and Cheatham were operating on lines nearly at a right angle  and several miles apart.  Had they attacked with vigor at the  same moment the result might have been different.  Fortunately  for Blair who occupied the hill for which the enemy was  contending, the assaults were so disconnected that he always  had time to change front to meet each one when it came.      One thing that made it comparatively easy for Hardee to  gain Blair's flank and rear was the fact that Sherman had sent  Garrard's cavalry on the 21st to Covington to destroy the  Georgia railroad.  Had the cavalry been with the left wing it  is quite probable that some scouting party would have  discovered the movement in time to check it, or at least to  have given a different turn to the battle.      At Decatur was Sprague's brigade of Fuller's division  guarding a train.  About the time that Hardee began his attack  two divisions of Wheeler's cavalry made a descent upon Sprague  in an endeavor to capture the train.  Sprague disposed his  force in such a way as to cover the withdrawal of the train  and put up a gallant resistance to a vastly superior force.  Reilly's brigade of Sweeny's division came to his assistance  and Wheeler was repulsed with a loss estimated at from 500 to  Sprague lost 242 men, most of whom were evidently captured, as  Wheeler reported about 225 prisoners.         Gen. J. D. Cox reports the Union losses in the battle of  the 22nd at 3,521 in killed, wounded and missing.  Full  returns of the Confederate casualties are not available, but  Logan estimated them at 10,000.  His command captured 5,000  stand of small arms, 18 stand of colors and 1,107 prisoners.  The total number of prisoners taken by the Union army was  about 2,000.  Walker's division lost so heavily that the  remnants of its brigades were assigned to other commands.        Hood made another sortie on July 28, at Ezra Church  (q. v.).  After that Sherman settled down to a siege, with  occasional cavalry raids against the railroad communications  south of the city.  (See McCook's, Stoneman's and Kilpatrick's  Raids.)  These expeditions having failed to destroy the  railroads, Sherman decided to intrench the 20th corps, now  commanded by Maj.-Gen. H. W. Slocum, at the railroad bridge  over the Chattahoochee and at Pace's and Turner's ferries, and  move the rest of his army to the south of Atlanta.  This  movement began on Aug. 25.  The 4th corps was relieved by  Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, and covered the withdrawal of  the 20th corps to the river.  The next day the 4th and 14th  corps were massed on Utoy creek, and by the evening of the  27th the entire army except Slocum's corps was between Atlanta  and Sandtown.  Hood had unconsciously played into Sherman's  hands by sending Wheeler with about 10,000 cavalry to cut the  Western & Atlantic railroad in the rear of the Union army,  thus weakening the Confederate forces in the field where  Sherman was now operating.  On the night of the 28th Thomas  was at Red Oak a station on the West Point railroad Howard,  with the Army of the Tennessee, was at Fairburn, and Schofield  was near Mt. Gilead church, about 4 miles east of Thomas.   Hood sent out Hardee's and S. D. Lee's corps on the 30th to  check Sherman's movements and save the railroads if possible.  During the next few days skirmishes occurred at Red Oak, Rough  and Ready Morrow's mill, Mud creek and some other places; the  battle of Jonesboro was fought on Aug. 31, and Sept. 1, and  the fighting continued around Lovejoy's Station until Sept. 5.  In the end the enemy was beaten at every point, for on the  night of the 31st the Federals were in full possession of the  railroads.  Upon learning this Hood realized that further  resistance was useless, and at 5 p. m. on Sept. 1, the  evacuation of the city was begun.  During the night heavy  explosions were heard by Sherman's army, 20 miles south,  caused by blowing up their stores and magazines, and the next  morning it was discovered that the Confederate force at  Jonesboro had been withdrawn during the night.      In the meantime Slocum's command had been engaged in  constructing works at the railroad bridge and ferries, the 1st  division being at the bridge, the 2nd at Pace's ferry and the  3rd at Turner's.  On Aug. 27, French's division, with 4 pieces  of artillery, came out and made a spirited attack on Slocum's  position, but it was handsomely repulsed with considerable  loss to the enemy and very slight loss to the Union forces.  The explosions on the night of Sept. 1, were heard in Slocum's  camp, and early the next morning he sent out adetachment of  the 2nd brigade, Ward's division, under Col. John Coburn, to  make a reconnaissance in the direction of the city and learn  the cause of the explosions.  Coburn reached the old line of  the Confederate works and found it abandoned.  In the suburbs  of the city he was met by Mayor Calhoun, with a committee of  citizens bearing a flag of truce.  The mayor formally  surrendered the city and about 10 a. m. Ward's division  marched in and took possession, the remainder of Slocum's  corps following later.  The Army of the Cumberland reached the  city on the 8th and took position in the works around it to  guard against any attempt to retake it. Sherman ordered all  families of Confederate soldiers to move southward within five  days, and all citizens of the north, not connected with the  army, to move northward, as the city was required purely for  military purposes.  When the march to the sea was commenced  the torch was applied to all buildings except churches and  dwellings, but as the work was somewhat indiscriminately done  many buildings of the exempted classes were consumed. Source: The Union Army, vol. 5